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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ISSUE FRAMES

A Methodological Overhaul

State and Organized Crime Networking

Because of the increasingly organized and lethal
nature of criminality in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), OC policy may be the single most
important safeguard for regional security. Nearly every current report, in fact, stresses OC’s increasingly threatening impact “on the economic
and sociopolitical environment of the region” as
it fuels manifestations of criminal violence such
as “trafficking of persons, exploitation of natural resources, threats to protected areas, forced
displacement, criminal governance, robbery,
physical aggression, extortion and kidnapping,”
according to UNDP.

Though essential to organized crime (OC),
state involvement has not been sufficiently
categorized. In the Latin American and
Caribbean region (LAC), such involvement
ranges from direct cartel formation, as in
Venezuela; uneasy tolerance and regional
collaboration, as with dissidents of the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
in Colombia; formation of paramilitaries and
“voluntary” police, as in Nicaragua; businesscentered operations, like those in Peru
and Brazil; and fluid police-OC alliances,
as in Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico.
These links are expanding throughout the
region as governments become increasingly
unaccountable amid democratic deterioration
and
COVID-19-fueled
socioeconomic
disruption. Such involvement spreads along
very
disparate
dimensions:
geographic
region, levels of government, and types of
arrangements, among others. These differences
have slowed the development of standard
methodologies to make the connections that
are key to effective policy. This report posits
a broad way to begin reexamining overlapping
state and non-state entities to better separate,
reconnect, and more accurately assess the
trajectory, extent, and power of these networks.

A recognition of the tandem growth of OC’s
forms, though, does not mean a policy-relevant
understanding of them. Such an understanding
requires disentangling these crimes’ many
overlapping sources, removing embedded layers
of methodological obstruction, and attuning
responses with OC practice. This multiple
challenge, though, first requires stepping back
to re-evaluate existing paradigms in at least
three ways that this report discusses. First is
to question existing OC data, since much of it is
suspect, biased, or incomplete – reflecting the
misalignment of institutional process and policy
goals. Second is the ways in which OC draws
its power from a multitude of local, national
and regional links among non-state, economic,
and state agencies that, like dark matter, are
omnipresent but largely invisible. Third is a
need to widen and re-examine physical and
geographic space.
Using embedded mixed methods to incorporate
the ways in which available quantitative data
and policies reflect the qualitative conditions
of the agencies and processes that produce
it, this report works to identify these broken,
frayed or invisible inter-connections through a
methodological framework as broadly flexible
as the criminality it aims to measure and stop.
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1. The State’s Security Sector: Organized Crime
policy often gets mired in chronic but avoidable
institutional insecurity. Any OC strategy needs
time, but little is afforded by the security
sector’s high rate of personal rotation after
and between elections. The average mandate
of an LAC police commissioner is two years;
some countries have a new security minister
almost every year. Such uncertainty is fueled
and compounded by chronic institutional
change. On one level is the disruption from
top-level restructuring—whose logic on paper
quickly dissolves into competition in practice,
derailing even well-funded and ambitious
anti-OC plans, such as Mexican President
Felipe Calderón’s new Secretaría de Seguridad
Pública.1 In Guatemala, prisons are the source
of approximately 80 percent of extortion
calls, and the lion’s share from just one—
Cantel in Quetzaltenango.2 But the governor’s
request for cellphone blockers and body-scan
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equipment in the prison was denied, and the
anti-extortion interagency board he established
was halted when he was replaced in May
2020.3 Proliferation is another, less analyzed
level. When a crime policy invariably does not
produce announced results, there is a tendency
to form new agencies without sufficient study
of the ineffectiveness of those they replaced or
their relations with other agencies. Problems of
corruption and inefficiency that prompted the
change will thus likely be repeated—as seen
with new police units in Central America, the
Andes, Mexico’s new National Guard, and even
with U.S.-vetted units. Some countries have up
to 15 agencies focusing on a specific problem
like gangs, making coordination among them
nearly impossible. Such division is aggravated
by a lack of trust by the federal police in local
police units. Such proliferation also skews
policy away from broader and more effective
approaches. Since drugs are not just an issue of
trafficking, but also of addiction and distribution,
the most effective and holistic approach
thus involves a range of agencies, which
becomes more difficult when the institutional
balance shifts decidedly toward policing.
Most police reforms are adapted to a traditional
paradigm of transition when the start of a
democratic regime or government allows for an
opportunity to assess policy and re-engineer
structures. Yet, such opportunities are ending
due to a democratic deterioration in which
elected autocracies allow autonomous practices
to spread beneath the radar of national policy,
such as altering police laws and hierarchies to
create special units, facilitate mission creep,
encourage economic autonomy, and ally with
informal armed groups. For example, Nicaragua’s
police law (Law 872) permits units to form
their own “businesses,” which is a way of coopting them into the Sandinista dictatorship. In
Honduras, special units like the Tigres became
highly corrupt, and others, like the Policía
Militar del Orden Público, became increasingly
powerful as they expanded from street patrols
to investigation and repression. These trends
are global. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak regime, for
example, granted police stations autonomy
to pursue their own aims, which varied from
proselytizing to protection rackets. They also
encouraged local police alliances with the
baltagiya gangs controlling much of Cairo4—an
arrangement also seen with Nigeria’s Bakassi

Boys or Indonesia’s “ninjas.”5 In Venezuela, the
Circulos Boliviarianos, formed in 2001 to impose
social-political control in the barrios, has spread
into other local security structures, such as the
Comités Ciudadanos de Control Policial.6
2. OC structures: More debilitating than the
amply documented incapacities of state
structures is that they mirror, and are aggravated
by, the opposing characteristics of OC entities:
a constantly flexible workforce,7 linked chains
of autonomous geographic and specialized
nodes,8 and transnational coercive capacity.
Policymakers have moved past traditional
views of OC as competition among hierarchical
and discreet entities but have not yet fully
reconceptualized new frameworks centered
on relationships, identities, and schemes.
After all, what is the difference between
an association of criminals and a criminal
association, between a mob-run firm and a
firm that collects and pays bribes, or between
a police station and a local militia? Throughout
LAC, OC hierarchies are giving way to churning
alliances that maximize efficiency and minimize
legal exposure by incorporating a range of legal
and illegal entities; sharing physical, electronic,
and financial resources; and burrowing into
the gaps among state agencies. In between
gangs at the neighborhood level and cartels at
the transnational is an expanding typology of
the number and types of entities with partial
and greatly under-analyzed OC involvement.
These include rural militias, business guards,
social workers (e.g., Caracas), social-cleansing
groups, communal self-defense committees
(e.g., Mexico’s Tierra Caliente),9 and, above
all, private security companies that dwarf the
public sector. Latin America has about 2.5
million police officers and at least 3.8 million
private guards (though certainly far more, since
the majority are unregistered). Collaboration
among these entities is constantly improving
through the diverse array of products they
produce, transport, and sell, including narcotics,
pharmaceuticals, firearms, property (ranches,
auto shops), money (gambling, currency
exchange), humans (trafficking, prostitution),
and natural resources (timber, mining, palm oil,
wildlife). Such market diversity is facilitated by
resource sharing: physical (e.g., truck fleets,
airstrips), electronic (e.g., malware; prison
cellphone smuggling), and financial (e.g. real
estate investments). The lucrative alliances
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that emerge are equally diverse: religious
settlers and drug traffickers in Peru; mining
groups and political parties in Bolivia; coyotes,
narcotraffickers, and maras in Central America;
cattle rustlers and coca processors in Colombia,
and gold miners and energy companies in
Venezuela. In Petén, Guatemala, where narcoplanes land every ten days10 and residents fight
off military efforts to intervene, agricultural
ministry staff work with OC groups to cut down
rare trees that are shipped to the United States
in trucks that return with firearms.11
Such alliances sink deep into society. One
of OC’s most pervasive but least measurable
characteristics is social embeddedness: its
integration into society through a range of
services and pressures, such as protection,
extortion, and co-optation. One of the most
understudied is labor contracting. Many of the
patterns this report discusses have involved
OC-based diversification of labor markets
characterized by temporary contracts and
divisions of labor. In fact, even the majority
of those working for the Russian, Albanian,
and other “ethnic” mafias in New York are not
members of that ethnicity. In Colombia, many
FARC combatants from the former Agua Bonita
demobilization center (Espacio Territorial de
Capacitación y Reincorporación or ETCR) have
informal economic contracts with a range
of the area’s illegal operators.12 And a fuel of
LAC private security firms’ growth is their offer
of multiple services through a workforce of
contractors in dispersed locations. The state’s
criminal investigation, analysis, and prosecution
largely lack replicable methodologies to
identify these trends and to assess how that
incapacity reverberates through each stage of
the enforcement chain or how their databases
do not measure what they purport to. Even
for highly controlled items or substances (like
mercury, discussed below), state weakness
facilitates collaboration among producers,
importers, transporters, and consumers that a
social network analysis can map out to show
how, where, and when it unfolds. Operational
policies can then steadily incorporate these
forms of local collaboration. In its oversight of the
Cooperative Security Location in Comalapa, for
example, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
could integrate such local OC networks into its
operations to detect aircraft or vessels engaged
in illicit drug trafficking.
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The Enforcement Chain and Criminal Justice
1. Investigation and Prosecution: The
ineffectiveness of LAC’s judicial process, in
which less than 10 percent of homicides lead
to trial, is well known. So too are its causes,
from anemic budgeting to insecure personnel.
For OC investigations, though, a particularly
deep deficiency is that intelligence itself is not
assessed frequently or critically. Because of
reliance on sources that take time to develop,
strengthening of intelligence often means
expanding rather than questioning those
sources. A result is stalled or stale data that
limits intelligence in several ways. On a micro
level, a great deal of information comes from
informants within targeted geographic or
sectoral communities. But such sources quickly
shift or narrow. In South America, community
policing programs were a rich source of detail
for local intelligence but became biased as
dominant, often OC-connected cliques coopted them. On a macro level, one of the few
commonalities among LAC’s otherwise wide
variety of regimes is a politically-driven assault
on intelligence mechanisms. Along with the
dismantling of anti-corruption bodies in Central
America and laws restricting non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in Guatemala, Nicaragua,
and El Salvador,13 Supreme Courts are becoming
more politically pliable, which will invariably
harm their documentation units; fiscalías’
shrinking resources and autonomy are limiting
their intelligence gathering, and regimes are
stepping up defenestration of top officials
and subsuming independent-minded agencies
(such as Peru’s forestry office) when they
uncover corruption. These trends have been a
subject of criticism and concern, but their larger
combined damage on intelligence is not yet fully
recognized or absorbed.
Such blind spots prevent awareness of the
symbiotic mismatch between state and criminal
networks, as described above. In Colombia’s
Guaviare province, for example, massive coca
planting and cocaine processing are centered
on aggressive deforestation that fosters other
types of OC, particularly mining. Interagency
coordination is improving; police and military
work with fiscales and use real-time satellite and
drone monitoring. But such collaboration comes
under increased strain the further it falls behind
OC. For example, security officials complain of
poor state support in areas where they operate
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and the large size of protected areas where
they cannot. For example, they cite inconsistent
naval engagement, even though each month,
about four tons of coca—along with illegal
gold—are transported on the Inírida River that
borders the Nunuk indigenous area where state
presence is restricted. Such institutional gaps
widen as OC operations grow more effective
by expanding its participants, which currently
include the Puntiyeros,14 Gulf Clan, local gangs,
and the FARC’s First and Seventh Fronts. As with
other security reforms, blame invariably turns to
the judiciary. Security officials claim that all the
laws are too lenient and default on the release
of detainees and, therefore, must be overhauled
to enable more detention with less evidence.15
Similar gaps exist on other issues. For instance,
police and military officials in Guatemala say
their presence in high-crime zones gradually
encourages citizens to bring them intelligence
on drug distribution, extortion, carjacking, and
OC recruitment. But poor coordination with
municipal officials and changing directives
from above prevent this presence from being
consistent enough to build long-term citizen
trust—which is key to fully understanding local
conditions and crimes.
In addition to the lack of personnel and
resources to discern these changes, OC
prosecutors are hobbled by additional issues,
such as database sharing, competition among
other special offices, and limited territorial
presence. There is a lack of support for every
stage of an investigation, from the protection
of crime scenes to laboratories and recordkeeping. Guatemala’s Fiscalía lacks branches
in more than 40 percent of the country, while
low salaries and the danger of the job elevates
the likelihood of fiscales being bribed or killed.
Its anti-money laundering office, critical to
the battle with OC, not only lacks its own
analysts, but its prosecutors have to travel
by car, spending days on the road while the
money they chase whizzes through the banking
system.16 A study of the 391 murders in the
Honduran city of Comayagua between 2010
and 2012 found that only 13 percent led to
an investigation because only 34 cases were
investigated. Even successes are deceptive.
Most trials of major political or crime figures,
in Nicaragua and Guatemala, for example, may
result in convictions but rarely into a deeper
investigation of their OC operations. In Brazil,

Environment Minister Ricardo Salles quit in June
2021 under a cloud of a criminal investigation
into involvement with illegal wood exports,
which is likely to suspend the investigation into
the broader OC environmental networks with
which he was connected.17 Through the region,
mounting politicization of the police and courts
will make such investigations even less likely to
begin or conclude.
2. Trial and Sanction: Most OC cases are
mired in the criminal justice system, greatly
limiting the larger policy lessons that can
emerge from them. Aside from the political
and financial limits on courts are less apparent
but equally impactful restrictions caused
by regulations, jurisprudence, the law, and
procedural stalemates. In particular, insufficient
regulatory backing for laws critical to OC policy
does not just lead to exceptions or delays but
can nullify the law itself. Guatemala’s Ley de
Equipos Terminales Móviles (Decree 8-2013)
prohibits the use of cellphones within the
penitentiary system—a vital tool against OC
operations. In addition, some of the prisons
are dominated by MS-13 and the 18th Street
gang. But the institutional and regulatory
obstacles to implement that prohibition—such
as non-existent guard training and telephone
company obstruction—have made it dead on
arrival. In El Salvador, a Supreme Court ruling
blocked the police from investigating private
firms for misplaced arms, enabling them to
hide trafficking channels. According to Mexico’s
National Private Security Council, more than
80 percent of private firms operate outside
local, state, and federal regulations. In other
cases, judges are buried in regulations. For
instance, Peru has over 30,000 environmental
laws extending across 12 legal categories
(agriculture, water, mining, etc.). These huge
regulatory gaps, such as on peatlands and
construction, have been a boon for OC. All these
legal imbalances—combined with the dearth of
laboratories, prosecutors, courts, and judges
themselves—result in a limited process whose
OC suspects are mostly from its lower ranks.
Security officials’ frustration at this judicial
impotence further aggravates tensions between
them and their judicial colleagues.
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Regional Dynamics: Political and Geo-Spatial
Analysis
Given the many forms of LAC integration—
from contraband to politics—OC policy needs
to better track and adapt to changing national
conditions. Three areas provide possible
starting points.
1. Border Zones: First is recognition of the
particular OC ecosystems of border zones.
In Central America, the Caribbean coast of
Honduras and Nicaragua, through which the
vast majority of cocaine exports transit, is
populated by indigenous peoples with politically
fractured federations. In Honduras, they have
varying levels of alliances and accommodations
with traffickers, and in Nicaragua, they face
the additional complication of repression
by an autocratic regime. Along the northern
tier of the Colombia-Venezuela border, OC
groups’ takeover has brought security and
thus increasing support for them by the
Wayuu peoples. Further south on the border,
alliances between FARC dissidents in Colombia
and state-sponsored cartels in Venezuela
have enabled unencumbered OC operations.
Guatemalan Governance Ministry officials say
that any possibility of controlling OC in the
Mexico border departments must center on
documenting local-level collaboration, such
as how the Zetas and immigration officials
join the maras to extort migrants and develop
links with narco- and human traffickers.18 One
of OC’s more concentrated border zones is the
coastal frontier of Guatemala and Honduras,
where trafficking of humans, narcotics, and
arms is fueled by the interaction of legal and
illegal money and business, state, and OC
actors. These conditions push local society into
the hands of OC: flooded fishing communities
in Cuyamel were expelled by police from nearby
highlands when they tried to resettle, elderly
activists in Omoa received death threats when
they complained about the state’s power plant,
and municipal officials ignored reports of
extortion by truckers from Puerto Cortés.19 Such
relationships are too specific to each location
to be implemented into regional policy, of
course, but focusing on their common traits—
such as distrust and displacement—can be.
In July 2021, U.S. personnel from Joint Task
Force-Bravo, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Honduran Armed Forces, and
other units conducted a joint training to enhance
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disaster response readiness. These efforts can
be strengthened by providing climate change
adaption, assessing the provision of social
services, and establishing anonymous channels
for citizen complaints.
2. Political and Policy Reverberations: Another
foundation for a durable policy-focused
methodology is to track the regional effects of
specific policy changes. For example, a study
of the 2004 lapse of the U.S. Ban on Assault
Weapons (H.R. 4296) showed an increase in
homicides in Mexican cities near the border
states (excluding California, which retained
most of the ban).20 Such an approach can be
replicated by following developments in states
like Florida, production by specific companies,
or regulatory changes such as the transfer
of arms export licensing authority from the
State to the Commerce Department during
the Trump administration. Tracking a particular
cache of weapons—many of which end up in
OC hands, as discussed below—can also be
quantitatively well-grounded while exposing
corruption along the supply chain. For example,
Honduras imported 3,064 machine guns from
Colt between 2015 and 2017, but did not
analyze where they ended up. Another form of
regional influence is judicial. A recent example
is a lawsuit filed in August 2021 by the Mexican
government in federal court against a dozen
U.S. gun manufacturers whose weapons have
been used in Mexico.21 Many of the points of the
complaint, such as negligent marketing, follow
the path set by the lawsuit against Remington
by the families of the 2012 Sandy Hook killings.
A more amorphous but ultimately more damaging
regional trend is political. The well-known
“wave” view of contemporary democratization in
different regions is gradually being applied to the
current wave of authoritarianism, but primarily
within the realm of electoral politics. Far more
needed is a microanalysis of how key agencies
are captured, politicized, and repurposed.22 For
example, agencies responsible for upholding the
rule of law or promoting human rights—such as
the Fiscalía, Procuraduría, rights commissions,
and Defensoria del Pueblo—are often not just
neutralized but used for ends contrary to their
mandates, such as denigrating or downgrading
certain rights, forcing state employees to overtly
support the regime, or spreading disinformation.
One current study in Honduras reveals that two-
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thirds of the electorate subscribe to websites—
many affiliated with political actors—that
post false information, and employees of the
state’s Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica
are routinely pressed into overt shows of
pro-government support. In 2012, Nicaragua
established a Unidad de Análisis Financiero
to investigate money laundering because of
pressure from the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). Yet this organization has used it to launder
foreign aid and track political opponents. Such
practices, many of which can be traced back to
Venezuela after 2000, have spread to every LAC
regime type and governance area.
3. Supply Lines: Drawing on the regulatory gaps
and network flexibility discussed above, OC
has reconfigured supply lines, from short (e.g.,
selling drugs on street corners) to long (e.g.,
overseas shipping). Such patterns are emerging
around the world, such as heroin smuggling
along old contraband routes through the Sahara
and Baluchistan. In the Caribbean basin, unclear
regulations and sparse enforcement coverage
have solidified sea routes, as seen through
such developments as cocaine shipments
docked in ports on Panama’s north coast and an
increase in Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported
(IUU) fishing, which prompted SOUTHCOM
to participate in the Operation Southern
Cross deployment and the 2021 Tradewinds
Operation. Local supply lines are logistically
separate but operationally connected, blurring
long-held distinctions of crimes by scale and
complexity. In many areas, predatory crimes
(e.g., carjacking and express kidnappings,
which do not require extensive planning) and
symbiotic crimes (providing legal goods and
services in illegal ways, such as waste disposal)
support and merge with transnational crimes
like narcotrafficking. Extortion, for instance,
has become one of the most common, reliable,
and often lucrative income sources because
it funnels money from thousands of individual
schemes into more extensive cross-border
OC operations. For quantitative analysis, such
patterns pose a challenge as variables morph
from interval to nominal; for example, extracted
gold goes not just to gold markets but is
dispersed into the range of OC groups and
laundering options.

CASE STUDIES
To show how these three issue frameworks
can help form and implement OC policy,
this section examines two of the most
intractable OC challenges—arms trafficking
and environmental crime—because they most
clearly and strongly embody network flexibility,
detachment from the enforcement chain, and
cross-national momentum. To combine and
apply those traits, both case studies include a
causal model based on the enforcement chain
that allows for a more focused examination of
each stage with a mixed-methods approach
composed of a quantitative analysis of data
and a qualitative analysis of the state entities
that produce and shape it. In particular, it
works to separate reliable from unreliable data
and then identify the links among the reliable
data that are most helpful to OC enforcement
and its ultimate policy goals. In enforcement
against OC operations ranging from extortion
to narcotrafficking, for instance, policymakers
begin with the relationships they can measure
and whose significance is steadily clear. Those
core connections, finally, are connected in this
section with their ultimate policy goal. In short,
by focusing on the most important links with the
most reliable data, this approach can identify OC
policy’s most embedded vulnerabilities and its
contribution to the long-term policy objective.
Firearms
Firearms are responsible for more than 85
percent of LAC murders, double the global
average of 42 percent. Most of the region is
awash in weaponry; Central America has more
than three million firearms. For OC groups,
arms are the most reliable bridge between legal
and illegal markets: They are an instrument of
physical control, a stable currency, a reliable
money-laundering channel, and a solid basis
for alliances with state actors. A wide range
of arms, from pistols to M72 rocket launchers,
end up each year with groups like MS-13, the
Sinaloa Cartel, and the Knights Templar.23
What are the weak links in the chain of
enforcement to control arms trafficking, and how
do state-OC networks and regional dynamics
shape them? Despite laws and institutions,
governments lack methodologies to assess this
process objectively and thoroughly.
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TABLE 1: THE CHAIN OF ENFORCEMENT
Investigation

Prosecution

Trial/Sanction

Policy Aims

1. Borders and
Imports

1. Seizure of
arms

1. Carry and possession charges

1. Arms in
Circulation

2. Private Exchange

2. Ballistics
testing

2. Trafficking
charges

2. Homicides
with arms

3. Registration

Source: Created by the author

In the enforcement chain, the first key step
of investigation is the flow of arms into the
country, which occurs through more channels
than the state can regulate or monitor. Despite
recent improvements, customs agencies have
not carried out systemic evaluations of straw
purchasing; the so-called “ant” trade;24 the
shipment of arms parts inside legal imports
like cars, microwaves (or in the recent raid
in Delaware, paint cans); non-competitive
contracts for importers; permit fraud; and the
excessive numbers of exemptions to import
rules. The role of private security is also hidden.
More than 40 percent of illegal arms in El Salvador
are connected to private firms, most of which
do not report sales or cooperate with criminal
investigations. Between 2006 and 2015, the
country’s biggest companies imported 27,910
arms.25 Since many of their owners are linked
to top political figures, growing authoritarianism
will likely strengthen those bonds. In the larger
context, as discussed above, is an inadequate
analysis of regional supply lines. For example,
in the United States, the “Iron Pipeline” on
I-95 is a constant source of arms in cities
with strict controls, such as New York City,
where 90 percent of those recovered at crime
scenes come from out-of-state.26 Even with
international borders, trafficking from South
America through Mexico is no less restricted.
Military officials estimate there are more than
100 blind spots on Guatemala’s border and 50
on El Salvador’s;27 in Honduras, OC entities have
bought land straddling its Caribbean border.
The second area of investigation is through registration and licensing: by assessing the kinds
of arms that are recorded, officials can more
accurately estimate what arms are illegally circulating and make connections with trafficking.
But categorization of registered arms is so inconsistent that basic categories such as “arms
of war” are ill-defined and not distinguished
from others like “rifles.” More than 70 percent
of arms licenses in the El Salvador Firearms
Registry have expired, while Guatemala’s Direc-
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ción General de Control de Armas y Municiones
lacks the capacity to monitor or suspend licenses, such as those of the 33 people possessing over 50 weapons. Coordination is poor:
police, prosecutorial, and court officials in all
three Northern Triangle countries say their respective agencies “do not talk to each other.”
Moreover, no Central American government has
a clear accounting of police and military arsenals; this is rooted in a persistent lack of trust
and cooperation between the armed forces and
prosecutors. In El Salvador, where the Fiscalía’s
Arms Trafficking Unit had only four officers as
of 2018, army officers have obstructed prosecutors investigating top officials, including a
former defense minister, for arms trafficking.28
Prosecution on arms, of course, requires
an actual seizure of weapons—in criminal
investigations or other operations—which is
followed in most countries by testing by the
Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS),
through which digital imaging of shells elicit
“hits” with specific weapons. Ballistics testing
is more critical in Central America than in
other regions due to each weapon’s frequent
use; a typical arm is used three times each
month, compared to once every six months
in the United States. But in 2017 Guatemala’s
Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses had
only 18 specialists, compared to 24 in 2011.
They receive over 100 arms each month, with a
backlog of more than 4,000 weapons.29
Causal Model: The most promising recent
step to control Central America’s arms
trafficking and use was taken by Honduras
with a comprehensive 2018 law whose many
provisions include strict possession limits and
a concerted registration drive.30
The law has promised support, including existing
and planned institutional change along the
enforcement chain. One of the most significant
has been the consolidation of customs units
under the Aduanas de Honduras, which operates
three air terminals, eight ports, and 12 land
passes. But even with document inspections
and gamma and X-ray systems to examine
350,000 containers each year, its capacity
falls well short of need. The import with the
highest rate of inspection—up to 45 percent—
is automobiles, but all smaller containers—in
which arms, arms parts, and ammunition are
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more likely to be hidden—are inspected far less
frequently.31 Many smaller ports of entry, such
as La Ceiba and Trujillo, lack most of the big
facilities’ scanning equipment. And, of course,
Aduanas does not extend to border blind spots.
Although there has been no official study, the
police know they exist near at least six customs
facilities, all in zones where contraband can be
quickly absorbed into local OC.
Another deficiency in the investigation stage is
the burgeoning private security sector, whose
growth far outpaces data about it. There is a
substantial data discrepancy in the number
of registered firms (the Security Ministry’s
Registry reports 1,497 registrations between
2000 and 2019, although the actual total
registered only adds up to 903), which all
officials acknowledge is a fraction of the total
operating in the country. Together, these firms
employ between 60,000 (according to the
Association of Private Security Companies in
Honduras) and 100,000 guards,32 making them
three to five times larger than the police. The
estimated number of firearms in the sector is
between 70,000 (according to the Comisión
Especial de Depuración y Transformación) and
400,000 (Violence Observatory, El Instituto
Universitario en Democracia Paz y Seguridad or
IUDPAS), with 33,000 carrying permits. None
of this data includes the country’s estimated
700 irregular armed groups, which together
may have up to 500,000 arms.33 Private sales
are regularly conducted at shows, pawnshops,
and through social networks. Many of those
arms are illegal “artisanal” weapons known as
chimbas, produced in workshops and “repair”
shops concentrated in the OC hotspots of
Cortés, Atlántida, and Olancho departments.34
Although the Military Police reports that
these arms ranked sixth in frequency in the
commission of crimes from 2014 to 2018,35 the
law does not have a plan to control them, and
the police does not have (or choose to provide)
statistics on them.
There is also a lack of accountability over the
enormous quantity of arms purchased by the
government. Between 2009 and 2018, it bought
over US$105 million in arms,36 reaching a record
of US$35.5 million in 2017 and 2018. Although
the defense minister said it is “impossible”
for weapons to leave military custody without
authorization,37 the loss is so commonplace

that police chiefs in the northern region say
that arms trafficking is one of the strongest
links between military officers and OC groups.38
Such links were seen during a 2019 arrest of
an MS-13 leader that seized heavy-caliber
weapons and police vests and later exposed
dozens of police officers at all ranks who were
collaborating with MS-13 leaders.39 Dozens
of anti-tank weapons were once stolen from
Salvadoran stocks and sold to a Mexican drug
cartel based in San Pedro Sula.40 Throughout
the region, military stockpiles are regarded as
the single biggest source of illegally circulating
weaponry.41
For registration, another key step in an
investigation, the new law is rooted in an
ambitious structure composed of a Weapons
Control Unit, the Control Section for Specialized
Weapons Services Fire and Ammunition,
and the Section for Control and Specialized
Services of Explosives and Related Materials.
To encourage registration, the National Arms
Registry coordinates closely with the state-run
Armería, the country’s only legal arms seller.
The Honduran Congress also plans to establish
44 ballistics laboratories and licensing centers
around the country, financed by income
generated by the law’s implementation. Such
plans are comprehensive and clear but, as with
security reform around the region, lack detailed
or realistic ways to fund, monitor, or evaluate
them. In this case, there has been no published
plan, schedule, or budget.42
The next stage in enforcement, testing seized
weapons, rests on an IBIS severely limited in
data and functionality. Less than 20 percent of
the weapons that arrive at the unit in charge—
the Dirección General de Medicina Forense
(DGMF)—are registered at the National Arms
Registry (though customs and other officials say
it is far less), meaning no owner can be easily
identified. DGMF received 18,083 weapons
between 2013 and 2019; 8,255 of these
weapons were linked to a crime between 2014
and 2018. But, most crucially, only 41 percent
were entered into IBIS. An underlying cause for
this uneven and limited process is institutional
deficiency. The lab lacks basic biosecurity
equipment, such as eye protection, had only
five specialists (as of the end of 2019) who work
in one daily eight-hour shift instead of the three
that would be needed to keep up with testing
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TABLE 2: ARMS CRIMES, HONDURAS, 2014-2019
Year

New Arms
Registered

2014

18,316

2015

20,451

2,551

2016

18,761

2017

16,008

2018

20,170

2019

Number of Reported
Arms Crimes

Seized Arms

Hits

Homicides per
100,000 persons

4,574

114

60.0

2,887

4,423

208

59.1

2,880

3,017

117

43.5

2,868

2,428

56

41.4

1,694

1,200 (est.)

46

43.6

3,295

demand.43 They examine about 2,000 weapons
annually, with a continual backlog of up to 5,000
to 10,000. According to officials, its equipment
is “completely obsolete.”44 Worse, IBIS was
closed in May 2019 because of a failure to pay
the annual licensing fee.
These
deficiencies
continue
into
the
prosecution and sanction stages. Between
June 2013 and November 2017, fewer than 10
percent of cases with “hits” were prosecuted.45
Although the Supreme Court’s Documentation
Center documents all legal cases, it does not
differentiate among arms convictions, so there
is no ability to analyze the number of carry,
possession, trafficking, or other types of arms
convictions, thus depriving OC policy of a
potentially useful data set.
In addition, the new arms law lacks the kinds
of interagency mandates or geographic focus
discussed in this report as necessary to apply
and evaluate data. For example, there is no
protocol for prosecutors to report back to the
DGMF on the role of hits in their investigations
and no analysis of trafficking at the department
level. Data uncertainty also impacts the two main
policy aims—circulating arms and homicides
with arms—very difficult to measure. Estimates
of the arms in circulation are so vast they are
methodologically useless (see Appendix 1).
Even if this number were clearer, it is so large
that any arms control law would have to make
enormous progress to make a measurable dent.
The number of homicides committed with arms
is also unclear, ranging from 45 percent to 85
percent (see Appendix 1). But since the numbers
reported by the state’s statistical arms are an
anomaly from the consensus, the homicide rate
can be used as a proxy for homicides with arms
in a causal model.
Amid the noise of poor data, what is the best
way to find policy-relevant relationships over
a statistically significant period? As discussed
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Number of Judicial Sentences of all
arms-related crimes
1,107 cases

3,157 cases

658, a drop attributed to the 2018 law

above, numbers in the first and final stages are
unreliable. In between, reliable data shows that
charges and sanctions have dropped, but the
data is not complete enough to demonstrate
a discernable time-lagged trend—or whether
this drop reflects a reduction in arms crimes or
investigative capacity. But one core relationship
in the enforcement chain is between seized arms
and the quantity of hits: the number of seizures
should theoretically increase the number of hits,
which is critical to understanding and solving
OC arms operations.
Analysis of this chart leads to several initial
conclusions. First, the number of reported
arms crimes and seized arms is a vanishingly
small percentage of circulating arms. Second,
there is no relationship between those two
numbers and quantity of hits, probably because
of the backlogs and relatively small number of
registered arms. Finally, a linear regression was
used in an initial test of the impact on homicides,
using the formula Y = B0 + B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 +
B4X4 + E, in which Y = Homicides per 100,000
persons; X1 = Arms Registered; X2 = number of
reported arms crimes; X3 = Seized Arms; and
X4 = Quantity of Hits.1 The resulting regression
yielded a predicted value for homicides of
49.52, affirming a lack of statistical significance
(Appendix 1). It also indicated that the model’s
homoscedasticity (homogeneity of variance)
is high. A mixed-methods approach could
identify the more determinative unincorporated
variables through quantitative assessment
of state actors, such as how political actors
and actions—like elected officials’ pro-gun
rhetoric—discourage objective data collection.
This model also demonstrates that the 2018
law needs to fully implement each provision
with long-term support.
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Environmental Crime
Environmental crimes—loosely defined as the
illegal production and trade of forestry products
like timber, minerals (e.g., gold, coltan), hydrocarbons, export crops (e.g., palm oil), and wildlife—is fast becoming a fulcrum of OC, earning
approximately $258 billion in 2016, sharply
up 26 percent from the previous year.46 Even
strong responses by consumer countries, such
as the U.S. 2008 Lacey Act, are falling behind
constantly morphing alliances that facilitate
this form of OC, ranging from Central American
narco-ranching to Miami’s narcotrafficking “river of gold.”47 In Mexico, some of the most lethal
OC groups—including the Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel,
and Knights Templar—have taken over many
mining operations, from extraction to export.48
Much of this OC centers on the Amazon Basin,
which holds half of Earth’s tropical forests and
whose goods are highly lucrative because of
the ease with which they are extracted, transported, and integrated into the licit economy. In
contrast to this fluid market is the state’s lack
of coordination, consistency, and judicial clarity
to investigate it. The OC use of timber exemplifies this contrast, beginning with the removal
of trees, which is facilitated by widespread corruption (such as sales of permits by officials,
or to speed up approval of environmental impact reports, which can take up to four years
in Peru); document falsification (such as saying
timber was extracted from a permitted area);
intimidation of indigenous and farmer populations; outdated road mapping, and inadequate
land titling—an estimated 70 percent of Amazon land is untitled. Once the timber is removed,
most of it is processed in sawmills increasingly
consolidated by OC. Like arms, timber is a bridge
from the legal to illegal markets since planks’
source wood is nearly impossible to trace. As
of 2019, Peru had approximately 250 registered
sawmills, but every regional official says there
are many more. In the country’s primary sawmill
zone, the Manantay port of Pucallpa—at a confluence of Amazon tributaries with a road link to
Lima—observations reveal dozens of unmarked
facilities, with daily output clearly beyond the
plank size and total volume permitted. Even the
head of the sawmill federation admitted to extensive legal violations.49 Criminality continues
into the next stage of transit. Illegal Brazilian
and Peruvian wood are laundered into Colom-

bian exports, with traders declaring that a species matches the one on the official documents,
while coca hidden in timber is smuggled to Brazil. Poor internet connections prevent verification at checkpoints, and disputes between local
and federal officials—such as over contraband
worth less than US$1,000, which prompts traffickers to ship cargo in smaller portions—are
common. In Peru, where wood transport requires a Forest Transit Permit (GTF), one study
found that on 48 percent of GTFs, stated points
of extraction were unverified.50 Observations of
forestry checkpoints also indicate the lack of
staff to supervise trucks fully; even those officials say corruption itself was the main motivation for creating more checkpoints. SOUTHCOM recently conducted Exercise Relampago
VI in Colombia to improve military deployment
strategies; a follow-up exercise could focus on
deployment against OC in its Amazon region.
While institutional relations are gradually coalescing as these obstacles are identified, they
remain characterized more by competition and
confusion than coordination. Environmental
ministries constantly clash with other ministries, and in Brazil, it has been absorbed into
the agricultural ministry. State-wide regulatory
confusion leads to streams of overlapping and
often conflicting data relevant to investigations.
For example, sustainable crop approvals depend on often unclear information on land titles,
tree species, financial credit, physical security,
and road quality. Many alternative crop approvals are fronts for cocaine, and many “artisanal”
mining permits are Trojan horses for large operations. Such inadvertent approvals generate
further criminality, such as when a logging concession spurs clandestine “fish bone” patterns
of illegal secondary roads.51 This combination of
political competition and regulatory confusion
has been compounded by decentralization as
already fractious relationships among federal,
regional, and municipal agencies are aggravated by widely varying policies and capacities on
the environment. For example, exploratory concessions are often approved locally without an
environmental impact study—in part because
dominance by a smaller number of businesses
in rural areas makes regional officials more beholden to them—resulting in a lack of key data,
like impacts on adjacent areas.
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Environmental police have been established
throughout the region but remain limited. In
Colombia, for example, violence confines police
to the perimeters of small municipalities, while
Forest Institute officials are often blocked by
militia owners even when they have a judge’s order. Despite the growth of environmental prosecutor units, which now operate in 13 countries,
these officials struggle to attain evidence and
witnesses. Remote locations and rapid physical degradation make physical evidence elusive, with a dearth of local labs to test collected
material. Witnesses, the other main element in
ascertaining abuse, are made scarce by record
rates of assassination.52 Together, these limits
steer enforcement agencies toward physical
raids, which rarely produce evidence acceptable
to judges and end up scattering loggers and
miners to new areas with a displacement that
multiplies enforcement challenges.53 Unreliable
data on imports, production, land use, and other
activities further limits sanctioning. Prosecutors
are also reluctant to act when state negligence,
unclear regulation, or faulty infrastructure are
involved, such as oil pipelines, targets of OC
sabotage in Mexico and Peru. Police and prosecutors throughout the Amazon also complain
that judges too often release suspects because
they are campesinos, have just small quantities,
or do not come with evidence (which is nearly unattainable), such as entering a prohibited
area. Chronically unable to meet criminal law
standards, judges usually hand down administrative and civil law sanctions in environmental
cases—fines, confiscations, permit suspensions, or restoration of damaged areas. These
rulings undoubtedly curb deforestation, but the
majority are unenforced or uncollected (in Brazil, under 1 percent of fines are paid), and there
is no methodology to ascertain when and how
they do. Since most fines are smaller than the

actual violation’s profits, the impact is widely
presumed to be limited.
Given the range of products, countries, and
production steps in environmental OC, how can
they be distilled into a replicable methodology
that informs policy? Such a model can center on
the chain of enforcement, which begins with an
investigation of abuses connected to five primary drivers of deforestation: ranching, mining,
agriculture, logging, and road building. When
monitoring generates alerts of unauthorized
activity, they prompt investigations of titles,
permits, and licenses to determine if violations
occurred in these five areas. Investigatory findings of culpability then lead to sanctions by environmental agencies or through criminal prosecution. Parallel to the aim of reducing deadly
firearm use, the result should be reduced deforestation, perhaps the best measure of the
causes and spread of OC, since it opens up areas for coca cultivation and illegal mining.
To test that hypothesis, this section posits a
causal model that correlates over a five-year
timeframe the initial stage, alerts over violations involving deforestation’s five main drivers,
with the final stage of policy aims, which is deforestation rates. Laying out this enforcement
chain will then help to ascertain causality: how
many alerts lead to an investigation, how many
investigations lead to sanctions, and how much
do sanctions decrease deforestation?54 Only by
identifying those regulatory gaps will we see
how OC weaponizes them.
Parallel to Honduras and its new law as a case
study for arms, Colombia is a good case study
for environmental OC. Its courts and primary
environmental law, Law 1333 of 2009, is one of
the world’s strongest, with an extended statute

TABLE 3: THE CHAIN OF ENFORCEMENT
Investigation
1. Ranching

Prosecution
Permits and Licenses:

2. Mining/ Extraction 1. Land: impact studies, indigenous area
regulations, production limits,
3. Agriculture
2. Extraction Permits: logging, mining
4. Timber
3. Transformation: smelting, sawmills
5. Road Building
4. Transit: roads, waterways, air routes
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Trial, Sanction

Results

1. Fines

Rates of

2. Penal Sentence

Deforestation

3. Restoration
4. Community Service
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of limitations and burden of proof on alleged
offenders—giving it the region’s best arsenal
against environmental OC. Its already powerful
armed forces have been supplemented by environmental, rural, and anti-mining units (Unimic
or Unidad Nacional de Intervención Contra la
Minería Criminal). Regulations are also well developed. Any activity requires an Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EIA); a Licencia Ambiental; and
an Informe de Cumplimiento Ambiental. Most
ranching and mining licenses are issued by the
Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales
(ANLA), and logging requires an approved Forestry Management Plan (PMF or Plan de Manejo
Forestal). There are also three main transport
permits.
But even with this support, the country struggles
to stem rapid OC alliances of deforestation,
mining, and cocaine. Deforestation increased
23 percent in the 2016-2018 period, while
80 percent of all mining is illegal, earning an
estimated $2.4 billion a year.55 The primary
catalyst for most of this destruction is cocaine,
whose production levels are higher than at
any point during the civil war. The amount of
land in Colombia used to harvest coca spread
out to over 212,000 hectares in 2019, while
cocaine production rose by 8 percent.56 The
socioeconomic embeddedness is apparent:
Farmers say that with coca, “in five days there’s
money in your pocket,”57 providing a steady
income up to a thousand times more than from
dairy or other crops. Poor regulation similarly
fosters OC in the mining and hydrocarbon
sectors. Since the peace accords opened access
to the Amazon after 2016, mining is estimated
to be the biggest cause of deforestation. Areas
affected nationally by only alluvial gold mining
grew from 79,000 hectares in 2014 to 84,000
hectares in 2016,58 in part because an estimated
two out of every three operations take place
outside regulatory frameworks. Many other
types of mining, such as rare earth minerals
and coltan, are even less regulated. The ANLA
gives permits for artisanal mining operations,
but budgetary limits, staff turnover (ANLA had
eight directors between 2011 to 2020),59 and
endemic corruption60 severely limit its regulatory
reach. Governance overlaps aggravate the
problem; gold mining permits, for example, are
routinely granted by municipalities. Organized
Crime groups run supply lines of cyanide, and
those reporting violations are attacked. Many of

the ANH-granted 44 hydrocarbon exploratory
blocks overlap with indigenous territories and
protected areas.
Even though national law is strong, it is disconnected from the Amazon’s reality. Colombian
Resolution 261 of 2018, for example, establishes the “Agricultural Frontier” by separating
economically active and protected areas, yet
doesn’t adequately address the overlap of more
than four million hectares of protected areas,
indigenous land, mining titles, water districts,
and empty lots. A case in point is Caquetá. With
the country’s highest rate of forest loss, 80
percent of the economy is based on ranching,
which is constantly expanding because of the
region’s poor soil. In addition, licenses are rarely denied, regulations are regularly skirted, and
the growing collaboration of ranchers and narcotraffickers in protected areas is often overlooked.61 Regulatory and political tensions also
come together over local roads.62 Alarmed at
how they facilitate OC, the national government
has tried to close these roads, but local officials
and communities vehemently oppose this and
argue that they are the only way to replace illegal with legal and sustainable activity.63
Many other gaps are geographic in a region
whose vastness and topography allow OC to
avoid detection altogether. Criminal groups
known Bacrim (Bandas Criminales, many of
which spun off from drug cartels) work with
local businesses and pay people in reserves
to log trees, while mining operations are increasingly run by FARC dissidents linked to the
Sinaloa cartel. In contrast, most riverside posts
have between 10 and 20 officers to patrol an
average of 170 fluvial kilometers (km). Further
inland, miners and loggers often have enough
warning of military raids to move to new locations. In addition, a lack of satellite signals
prevents real-time communication among enforcement agencies, and the Judicial Police lack
needed training and vehicles like helicopters
to get to the crime scenes.64 Since all officers
rotate every one to two years, they cannot develop expertise or intelligence, such as tracking
social media sales or OC trafficking. Many police
complain that organized crime infiltrates nearly
every judicial unit.65
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TABLE 4: ALERTS AND HOTSPOTS: AMAZON REGION OF COLOMBIA, 2015-202066
2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015

Caquetá
DF Alerts

Putumayo

Vaupés

7.7%

Guaviare

Guainía

9.0%

Hotspots
DF Alerts

356/8.9%

392/9.8%

8/0.2%

0/0%

592/14.8%

0/0%

Hotspots

4,498

1,422

223

365

2,867

401

DF Alerts

308/7.7%

327/8.2%

148/0.4%

0/0%

320/8.0%

20/0.1%

Hotspots

8,399

2,612

148

561

5,038

858

DF Alerts

448/11.2%

216/5.4%

120/0.03%

80/.02%

548/13.7%

0/0%

Hotspots

10,030

2,510

137

453

7,850

759

DF Alerts

419/11%

Hotspots

5,831

DF Alerts

895/12%

Hotspots

19,054

659/19%/
1,412

80

263

8,302

680

2,520/15%
6,269

Causal Model: As mentioned above, deforestation is a good measurement of environmental
OC since it is the first step in opening up areas
for coca, mining, and transit. Using Colombia’s
more comprehensive databases, one of the
more statistically reliable causal models would
thus test the correlation of deforestation alerts
of the five drivers of deforestation through the
enforcement chain to the policy endpoint of
deforestation rates. Here, it is applied across
the country’s six Amazon departments: Vaupés,
Guaviare, Guainía (under the regional body CDA
or Corporación de Desarrollo Sostenible del
Norte y el Oriente Amazónico), Caquetá, Putumayo, and Amazonas (under the regional body
Corpoamazonia). It then examines the relationships among the intervening variables: alerts
leading to investigation, investigations leading
to sanctions, and sanctions decreasing deforestation. Colombia has three types of alerts:
fires, deforestation, and hotspots (zones where
ecologically destructive and unauthorized activity has been reported). But alerts are not
recorded consistently or reliably. The Institute
of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental
Studies (IDEAM) and officials of the Autonomous Regional Corporations (CARs: Corporaciones Autonomas Regionales), which oversee
environmental policy in the country’s regions)
only provide general extrapolations, estimating 1,000 alerts each quarter, totaling approximately 4,000 annually.
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Amazonas

546

1,217

13,471

1,851

These alerts then lead to an investigation, but
the number of investigations is not reported,
and there is no documentation of violations of
the regulatory permits described above. The
number and types of specific sanctions are
provided (see Table 5), but officials from every
agency doubt that the effect of investigations
or sanctions can be reliably measured or that
they are significant. Inconsistency throws the
data’s reliability further into doubt. There is a
divergence of numbers reported by different
agencies, while a lack of reports after 2016 indicates a drop in monitoring. Judicial dysfunction
worsens data analysis. For example, all 1,150
environmental sanctions imposed by Corpoamazonía from 2009 to 2016 were discarded for
contravening due process.
TABLE 5: FINES: SANCTIONS FOR DAMAGES
AND VIOLATIONS OF REGULATIONS,
2014–2019
Caquetá
Putumayo

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

49

51

66

74

70

77

7

8

1

0

Amazonas
Guaviare

0
1

Guainía
Vaupés

111

8

27

20

7

4

10

5

9

2
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The rate of alerts from each year between
2015 and 2018 were correlated with the rates
of deforestation in the six departments to test
whether increased alerts led to decreased deforestation. A negative correlation among those
rates would indicate the impact of state enforcement. But initial regression tests show no
significant effect for two of the three years in
which complete data is available. Changes in
2016–17 were 0.28; in 2017–18, it was -0.100;
and in 2018–19, it was -0.59 (See Appendix 2).
In short, there is no demonstratable relationship between alerts and deforestation, indicating the ineffectiveness of current enforcement
mechanisms and OC policy. Similar results are
seen in the five Amazon regions of Peru (see
Appendix 2).
TABLE 6: AMAZON DEPARTMENTS: COMBINED LOSS OF PRIMARY FOREST AND TREE
COVER, IN HECTARES
2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

140,000

124,035

178,597

219,973

197,159

383,000

Caquetá

29,245

23,812

26,544

60,373

34,527

30,317

Putumayo

11,106

9,214

11,117

13,070

13,903

10,759

Amazonas

1,723

1,277

1,913

1,362

782

1,139

Guaviare

6,892

9.364

11,456

38,211

34,527

24,220

Guainía

1,300

1,350

2,752

847

2,390

1,433

Vaupés

1,967

1,116

1,949

2,288

1,123

2,059

National66

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Most of LAC’s more effective criminal policies—new police units, penal code reforms—
are better suited for fixed structures than fluid
realities. A new policy must instead adopt the
characteristics of the entities it faces, such as
operational flexibility, on-the-ground communication, and continuous assessment. This section outlines seven concrete areas in which to
initiate such an approach.
1. Security Official Training and Careers: The
ways in which security officials work individually and collectively against OC need greater
attention. One of the biggest obstacles to coherent OC policy is interagency competition
for resources, power, and territorial control. An
example of this approach is Colombia’s military-led Burbujas Ambientales, in which representatives of the armed forces, police, Fiscalía,

civil society organizations, NGOs, indigenous
federations, and other key actors meet biweekly to discuss action against environmental OC.
Such meetings expose gaps in knowledge, policy differences, and weaknesses in evaluation.
They also narrow down policy to shared interests and motivations, making policy narrower but ultimately more sustainable. Structured
collaboration also boosts professionalism and
coordination, which also helps strip policy of
unrealistic aims and administrative obstructions. As of 2020, the Burbujas had 32 control
posts to report information in real-time, and the
consortiums combined it with other local and
national data (supported by IDEAM’s daily reports) in a CompStat approach to continuously
adjust operational policy.
On an individual level, an assessment must
also be made of the career regulations and
practices that limit OC expertise and objective
evaluation, such as frequency and criteria for
rotation among locations and units, individual
and unit-level accountability, and informal rules
and discretion for promotion. Curriculum adjustments are also needed; for example, only 30
hours are dedicated to the intelligence cycle in
most LAC police academies, which is only about
a third of what would be needed for long-term
OC specialization. Another needed institutional reform is of Internal Affairs, which should be
strengthened not just to ensure accountability for abuses, but also to assist officers with
professional and personal pressures, which can
unlock ideas for personal and policy reforms.
2. OC Surveillance Dashboards: To fortify policymaking, a surveillance dashboard can use supervised machine learning to secure, analyze,
and disseminate data from target locations,
such as OC hubs like Petén or Olancho. Such
a dashboard can bring together detailed socioeconomic, legal, demographic, environmental,
and other relevant data gathered by NGOs and
private firms to detect often overlooked patterns and correlations that capture the full picture of the constantly changing local conditions
that allow OC to blend into local socioeconomic activity. Drawing on models like the Wildlife
Trade Portal and the Tracking Natural Resource
Corruption initiative, such an approach will provide the intelligence needed to lay out a causal model inclusive of all conditions. Among the
many stages on the logging chain, for example,
are land titling, species verification, indigenous
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community approvals, transport permits, and
access to controlled substances like mercury.
Specifying how state agencies, non-state actors and local conditions subvert each of those
stages will lead to a more accurate stress test
for OC policy. Such social network analysis helps
map out the overlapping and constantly shifting
alliances, and a dashboard will make them visible on a platform for ongoing spatiotemporal
analysis.
3. Crime as a Variable: Methodological approaches need to examine specific forms of
OC as both an independent and dependent
variable—that is, as a product and a cause of
other conditions. A policy goal of SOUTHCOM,
for example, is to determine the push factors
of migration from Central America. One of the
most common is extortion: nearly everyone in
the region engaged in economic activity—from
multinational corporations to street corner food
sellers—pays extortion fees. As one Honduran said, “We would rather pay a coyote for the
American dream rather than an extortionist for
our daily nightmare.”67 But as a pervasive and
amorphous form of crime, how can extortion be
approached methodologically in a way that informs policy? First, demographic and economic
characteristics, such as the percentage of youth
or women as household heads, can be used as
independent variables to determine their quantitative causation with levels of extortion from
specific regions. Such findings can support local projects of SOUTHCOM’s Women, Peace, and
Security program. With extortion rates as an independent variable, policymakers then need to
examine its differentiated damages, such as its
impact on different kinds of businesses, such
as the health and transportation sectors.
At each stage of this causality, the source of
all data must be questioned. Guatemalan officials estimate that just one in three cases of
extortion are reported, for example, but can cite
no methodology or sources for that estimate.
More broadly, if a jurisdiction reports an 80
percent increase in kidnappings one year and
an 80 percent decrease the next—which happened in Mexico—it is necessary to investigate
the reliability of these statistics or the sources
of such a drastic change. Similarly, OC policy in
LAC lacks methodologies centered on time lags
to measure a policy’s potential future impacts,
while in other cases, local data is uneven. The
comprehensive approach of Mexico’s Sistema
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Único de Información Criminal (SUIC) centers on
gathering data on all forms of crime, such as
stolen cars, names of private security agents,
and the location of arms reserves. But up to 30
percent of municipalities do not send enough
data to allow SUIC to apply nationwide analysis.
Such patchy data then prevents the detection
of connections between criminal groups. Since
one tested approach with a built-in capacity
to address this range of quantitative deficiencies is CompStat, OC needs a multidimensional
CompStat to assess the reliability of reported
numbers and then apply it to map out the effects of operations and policy over multiple future scenarios. An example of a starting point
for such an undertaking is Honduras’s Plan de
Erradicación de Demoras Judiciales, which identifies backlogs in each courthouse. A CompStat
approach can then use those numbers to create
a quantitative prediction and assess how well
each court will handle OC cases over time. The
integral use of technology can support (though
never constitute) this approach. Examples include forms of blockchain or online accounting,
such as Brazil’s Documento de Origem Florestal,
to track each stage of the forestry production
chain.
4. Geospatial Analysis: One of the most common but weakest methodological dimensions of
criminological policy is displacement. On firearms, for example, illegal imports easily move
to smaller ports or land crossings in response
to stepped-up enforcement in another. On extortion, the police chief of Mixco, a high-crime
city in the Guatemalan capital metro area, acknowledged that his successes increase OC in
nearby cities with similar conditions. But a lack
of coordination and capacity means that such
shifts remain unmeasured and detached from
national policy. Regarding environmental crime,
one of the few studies of displacement found
that in “78.2 percent of documented leakage
cases, reduced deforestation in protected areas was not sufficient to offset the amount of
deforestation in 10 km buffer zones to a level
that would be expected without protection.”68
But while forest coverage can be measured
relatively easily, other OC movements—money,
people, and narcotics—cannot. Responses to
this challenge include time-lagged spatial analysis to analyze criminogenic changes over time
in defined spaces. For example, policymakers
can examine how physical space raises OC risks
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in zones like transport hubs, informal markets,
and sports fields. Because types of crime are
less adaptable than location, it would be expected that groups extorting passengers and
drivers in a bus terminal subject to police action are likely to move to another bus terminal
rather than to a new type of crime. Such a study
can help determine the utility of strategies like
CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design).
5. Tracking Democracy: OC policymakers should
develop a triangulated understanding of how
institutional capacity, political pressures, and
public opinion shape OC policy amid democratic
deterioration. For example, one of the biggest
reasons for the delayed, politicized, and needlessly complicated transition to oral-based
criminal procedures throughout LAC were attacks on it being soft on criminals. Warning
signs about how current politics may undermine
OC policy include:
• Horizontal Accountability: LAC executive
branches leverage their administrative control
of security agencies to monopolize criminal
policy, which legislatures—often dominated
by the ruling party or fragmented among the
opposition—struggle to check. Policy focus
should therefore be on creating more autonomous investigation by legislative commissions.
• The Judiciary: Ongoing realization of LAC’s judicial fragility must be followed up by identifying specific points of weakness and augmenting
specialization, such as through existing circuits
on corruption and the environment, and—following models in a place like New York—on firearm crimes.
• Impunity: The high rate of those unpunished
for serious crimes is just one aspect of impunity. A connected but equally harmful dimension is the ensconced popular belief that many
sections of the population are exempt from
the law—from ordinary criminals to political
elites—which increases the appeal of extra-legal justice, simplistic populist policies, and other forms of democratic deterioration.
6. National Community Oriented Policing (COP):
Although it is one of the most significant paradigms and policy shifts in LAC crime policy, COP
has foundered because of weak institutional
buy-in, hostile political rhetoric, and, in cases

of progress, displacement of crime to adjacent
regions. Such weaknesses can be supplemented through such strategies as:

▪ Local design and assessment: When a COP

program is designed or run by the community
itself, it can withstand even high levels of OC
and daily criminality, as in Danlí, Maracaibo,
and La Paz. Key to their sustainability is panoramic assessment: COP needs structured and
continual assessment by residents to identify
weak points, such as lack of representation or
policy clarity. To help residents address those
problems, cities with COP should have mandatory weekly meetings among security and social services, as Choloma has done for several
years.

▪ Continuing training: LAC’s COP has been more

complementary than integral, allowing local police to sideline it. Such resistance will ultimately
be overcome through three key steps: realigning police academies and ongoing training, as in
Honduras’ Police Technical Institute curriculum;
encouraging buy-in from officers by integrating
COP with intelligence gathering and providing
more scheduling flexibility for lower-level officers, and improving top-down administration to
limit local commissioners from being subject to
constant operational and personnel shifts from
above.
7. Border Area Studies: As mentioned above, a
focus on how border areas foment OC is greatly
needed. It is also elusive, given the multitude
of locations and conditions involved. But several practical angles can be used. One example is a much more comprehensive analysis
of decentralization, which has been the most
comprehensive and necessary transformation
in Latin America because it makes the government more receptive to local problems. Yet, in
the security realm, it is characterized by a lack
of preparation, resources, and adequate coordination. A metropolitan area that needs a single policy may have up to a dozen different municipal-led police agencies. Venezuela’s 1989
Decentralization Law, for example, spurred an
increase from 21 to 126 police agencies, contributing to a 200 percent increase in crime. In
other words, a comparative examination of local
government can uncover vulnerabilities in border area security and OC. Another approach is
university-based regional collaboration. Amid
democratic deterioration, OC policy needs
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more stable, trusted, and objective institutional
grounding. One such basis are universities in OC
hotspots, which have the community trust, professional expertise, institutional permanence,
and political neutrality needed for the long-haul
fight against OC. One such network in the Amazon Basin is composed of the Universidade
Federal of Minas Gerais and of Rondônia in
Brazil, Colombia’s Universidad de la Amazonia,
the University of Guyana, Universidad Nacional Agraria de la Selva in Perú, and Suriname’s
Adem de Kos University.
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APPENDIX 1: ARMS TRAFFICKING AND USE IN HONDURAS
TABLE 1: HOMICIDES AND HOMICIDES CAUSED BY FIREARMS
Year

Homicides/100,000 persons

State Response

Security Secretariat

Info Segura

Sepol

2015

57.5-60.0

45.03%

75.0%

76.4

70.5% of all cases

2016

56.5-59.1

44.80%

75.9%

76.9

2017

41.7-43.5

31.07%

71.7%

72.6

2018

40.0-41.4

29.05%

71.0%

71.7

2019

41.2-43.6

26.3%

74.6%

TABLE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARMS IN HONDURAS, REPORTED 2017-2019
National Congress

University Institute for Democracy,
Peace and Security

United Nations Development
Programme

Security officials,
activists, specialists

400,000

650,000

700,000–800,000

1.0–1.2 million (2019)

TABLE 3: LINEAR REGRESSION: MODEL SUMMARY
Durbin-Watson
Model

R

R²

Adjusted R²

RMSE

R² Change

1

0.000

0.000

0.000

9.204

0.000

F Change

df1

df2

0

4

p

Autocorrelation

Statistic

p

0.412

0.748

0.075

Coefficients
95% CI
Model
1

(Intercept)

Unstandardized

Standard Error

49.520

4.116

Standardized

Descriptives

V5

N

Mean

SD

SE

5

49.520

9.204

4.116

Residuals Statistics
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

SD

N

Predicted Value

49.520

Residual

-8.120

49.520

49.520

0.000

5

10.480

-7.107e -16

9.204

5

-0.986

1.273

-1.110e -16

1.118

Std. Predicted Value
Std. Residual

25

5
5

t

p

Lower

Upper

12.031

< .001

38.092

60.948
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APPENDIX 2
TABLE 1: DEFORESTATION IN COLOMBIA REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Alerts

2016

Ch 16-17

2017

Ch 17-18

2018

Ch 18-19

2019

Caquetá

4,498

47

8,399

16

10,030

-42

5,831

Putumayo

1,422

46

2,612

-4

2510

-44

1412

Amazonas

223

-34

148

-7

137

-42

80

2,867

43

5,038

36

7850

5

8302

Guainía

401

53

858

-12

759

-10

680

Vaupés

365

35

561

-19

453

-42

263

Guaviare

Significance:
Deforestation

0.276229

-0.10077

-0.59699

2016

Ch 16-17

2017

Ch 17-18

2018

Ch 18-19

2019

Caquetá

26,544

56

60,373

-43

34,527

-12

30,317

Putumayo

11,117

15

13,070

6

13,903

-23

10,759

Amazonas

1,913

-29

1,362

-43

782

31

1,139

11,456

Guaviare

70

38,211

-10

34,527

-30

24,220

Guainía

2,752

-69

847

65

2,390

-30

1,433

Vaupés

1,949

15

2,288

-51

1,123

45

2,059

26

TABLE 2: DEFORESTATION IN PERU
Alerts
Madre de Dios
Amazonas

2017

0.919751

2018

0.62035

2019

314,203

-69.5

95,746

-77

21,899

95,318

-83.6

15,686

-64

5,599

Loreto

197,006

-38

122,048

-80

23,496

San Martin

127,274

-46

68,742

-83.6

11,266

81,562

-55

36,339

Ucayali

314,203

Significance:
Deforestation

0.297234

-74

0.538556

-0.00744

2016

Ch 16-17

2017

Ch 17-18

2018

Ch 18-19

2019

17,055

28

23,669

-0.8

23,492

-13

20,500

6,984

17

8,455

-12

7,453

-13

6,470

Loreto

37,151

-49

19,082

27.2

26,203

17

31,400

San Martin

20,589

-39

12,501

41.5

21,376

-29

15,100

Ucayali

29,611

1

29,905

-13.1

25,991

38

42,100

Red Lists

Y2016

Ch 16-17

Y2017

Ch 17-18

Y2018

Ch 18-19

Y2019
0

Madre de Dios
Amazonas

Madre de Dios
Amazonas
Loreto
San Martin
Ucayali

27

35

-34

23

-78

5

-500

9

19

11

-55

5

-80

1

60

21

76

15

89

-72

25

2

-200

0

0

0

0

0

13

-85

2

0

2

0
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